L++JAPAN+AND+MANCHURIA


 * The Manchurian Crisis 1931

In many ways Japan was a new nation in the early Twentieth Century. For three hundred years Japan had remained isolated and had resisted foreign intervention. Then in 1853 Japan was opened up to foreign contact by Commodore Perry on the behalf of the USA. The Japanese had no desire to become a Western colony and so modernised rapidly to catch up with the Great Powers. By the turn of the century Japan had fought successful wars with both China and Russia and had made it plain that it sought a **sphere of influence** in the Far East.

Japan fought with France, Britain and the USA in the First World War, but she felt poorly rewarded by the peace settlements of 1919. During the 1920s Japan faced considerable problems e.g. a rapidly growing population and a lack of land.

Japan had long had an economic interest in **Manchuria**, a part of Northern China. China was a complete mess by the 1920s; it was a country torn apart by warlords and extremist politicians. In 1931 the Japanese stage-managed an attack on the Japanese owned Manchurian railway by “Chinese bandits.” To protect their interests the Japanese army took control of the whole region. Both China and Japan appealed to the **League of Nations** to **arbitrate**.

The significance of the **Manchurian Incident** is that it was the first real test of the League of Nation’s principle of **collective security**. Theoretically, the League should have placed economic and military **sanctions** upon Japan as the aggressive member state. The problem was that the League was seriously weakened by the non-membership of the USA and Russia. In effect, the League was comprised of only two Great Powers, Britain and France, and a host of lesser nations. Any act of collective security would call for the leadership of Britain and France, but this was virtually impossible as both countries were in the grip of depression and were immersed in the problems of maintaining their own empires. Britain and France, acting for the League of Nations, were not strong enough to force Japan out of China, and neither country wanted to risk their colonies in the Far East. This was **appeasement**, Britain and France had undermined the League of Nations in return for short term peace; Japan got away with adding Manchuria (later called **Manchukuo**) to its empire.

The League appeared to take some action over the Manchurian Incident by sending **Lord Lytton** to the region on a fact-finding mission. Lytton took a year to report back to the League that Japan was indeed the aggressor in this case. But as each day had passed the Japanese had become entrenched in Manchuria and the League was unable to make Japan withdraw. Perhaps this appeasement was understandable under the circumstances; it is very unlikely that the general public in Britain and France would have had the stomach for a major war with Japan in the Far East, literally thousands of miles from Europe, a region which meant very little to ordinary Europeans. It is unlikely that the navies of Britain and France would have felt comfortable with or even have afforded such a conflict. The consequences of failure meant not only a loss of prestige, but also involved a direct threat to European colonies e.g. Singapore, in the Far East.

In 1933, Japan left the League of Nations, thereby weakening it even further. The invasion of Manchuria highlighted the fact that the League was neither able nor willing to act decisively when dealing with aggressors, particularly when they were powerful members of the League. The Manchurian Incident and the League’s failure to deal with it was a serious blow to the organisation. If Japan could act without serious consequence, what kind of message was being sent to other potentially aggressive nations in the 1930s?



//Using P6 and 7 of the text ‘**Roads to War’.**// //Answer in your notes/books, using the headings provided and combining the question with the answer//

**//Japan Manchuria and the League of Nations//**

**//Introduction//**

** //Who was Viscount Cecil?// ** ** //What was Viscount Cecil’s views of the likelihood of war in 1931?// ** ** //Why was he wrong?// **
 * //Viscount Cecil was the Chief British rep at the L of N//
 * T
 * //Cecil dod not think that war was likely in 1931//
 * //The Japanese invasion of Manchuria was the beginning of the Asian part of WWII//

**//The attraction of Manchuria//**

** //Which areas of China had Japan already taken over?// ** ** //Why did Japan want Manchuria?// ** ** //What effect did the Depression have on Japan?// ** ** //What was the argument used to justify taking over Manchuria?// ** **//Japan invades Manchuria//**
 * //Japan had taken over Formosa, Korea, Liaodong and Kiaochow//
 * //More land, inder-populated compared to Japan, resources ( forestry, minerals and agriculture)//
 * //Japan's trade had been ruined by the Depression - led to widespread unrest.//
 * //T////he Army officers talked of new land and resources therefore new jobs as a way out of the Depression//


 * //How did the Japanese army officers create an exceuse for invading Manchuria?// **
 * Japanese officers blew up their own railway and accused the Chinese of doing it as an excuse to invade
 * //How did China respond?// **
 * China responded by appealing to the League
 * //How did the League of Nations respond?// **
 * The league responded by sending ina Commission - the Lytton Commission and recommended that Japan get out of Manchuria
 * //What made the Japanese government’s position very difficult?// **

**//The League and Manchuria//**
 * //What was collective security?//
 * //What were the three weapons at the League’s disposal?//
 * //What prevented the League from using sanctions? ( two reasons)//
 * //What did the League therefore do?//
 * //Why was this action unsatisfactory?//
 * //What did Japan do after this?//
 * //What was the significance of the Manchurian Crisis for the credibility of the League///

**__Outcomes of the Manchurian Crisis__**
 * The Lytton Commission, sent to report on the trouble in Manchuria, declared Japan to be the aggressor.
 * It did not state that Japan had violated the League Covenant or recommend that any sanctions be applied. IN OTHER WORDS IT DID NOTHING.
 * Japan withdrew from the League in 1933 and by 1937 was invading all of China.
 * The West saw Manchuria as a problem of the EAST and was reluctant to intervene.